NATO After America
Some have said it was predictable. Others have said it was preventable. But almost all have said (those not employed in the White House) that the end of America’s war in Afghanistan, especially its departure, was a humiliating defeat. Indeed, it’s an unmitigated disaster of great consequence to America’s prestige and also to its security. And the evacuation of Americans and allies from that country in the wake of that defeat was a Taliban public relations dream come true. Perhaps lost in all the news from Kabul, which seems to change with every passing hour, were remarks in the British Parliament by a member of the House of Commons, Mr. Tom Tugendhat.
Mr. Tugendhat is a graduate of the University of Cambridge with a master’s degree in Islamic Studies. He is fluent in Arabic. Commissioned as a second lieutenant, he rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel and served in Iraq and Afghanistan. After being recognized by the Speaker he rose and gave an address which included the following: “The mission in Afghanistan wasn’t a British mission, it was a NATO mission. Afghanistan is not a faraway country about which we know little. It is part of the main. That connection links us also to our European partners, to our neighbours and our international friends. And so it is with great sadness that I now criticize one of them. Because I was never prouder than when I was decorated by the 82nd Airborne after the capture of Musa Qala. It was a huge privilege to be recognized by such an extraordinary unit in combat. To see their commander-in chief call into question the courage of the men I fought with – to claim that they ran - shameful.”
Not in living memory have the actions of a President of the United States been so described in either Houses of Parliament. The Commons, which can be loud and boisterous, sat not only silent but motionless, transfixed by what they heard and what they suspected they were about to hear. Mr. Tugendhat continued: “Those who have never fought for the colours they fly should be careful about criticizing those who have. We have demonstrated, sadly, that we, the West, the United Kingdom, does not have patience…and if we are not careful it could be a very, very difficult lesson for our allies. And it doesn’t need to be. We can set out a vision, a clear, articulated vision, for reinvigorating a European-NATO partnership, to make sure we are not dependent on a single ally, on the decision of a single leader, but that we can work together…with partners large and small, and make sure we hold the line together.”
This is a serious turn of events and not simply a politician’s statement to appease malcontent constituents. It is a bare outline but, nonetheless, the beginning of a discussion about restructuring NATO if need be without the participation of the United States. President Biden has apparently, and completely inadvertently, succeeded in accomplishing what President Trump began; namely the greater contribution of European powers to the transatlantic alliance, but not in the way Trump envisioned. Mr. Trump sought greater financial contributions from the Europeans toward the NATO budget. However, the idea which Mr. Tugendhat broached, but that other European lawmakers must be contemplating, deals with the decision-making process of the organization and whether American influence will continue to be the dominating factor or, indeed, any factor at all. Though unsettling, this is not the first time the topic has been considered.
Jacques Chirac, the President of France at the time of “Iraqi Freedom”, was so adamant in his belief of a “multipolar world order” - meaning a European foreign and defense policy independent of the United States - that he proposed a military treaty between France, Germany and Belgium as a counterweight to American geo-political strategy and completely outside NATO. The Pentagon rightly dismissed it as “the Chocolate Alliance” and ultimately it came to nothing.
But this time may be different. This time there are calls in Britain, America’s staunchest ally, for changes to the way the alliance works, and that is something that bears serious attention. If that is Britain’s contention, one can only imagine the attitude of France or Italy or Germany. Europe is now feeling that recent events are not part of Trump’s “America First” agenda but rather Biden’s “No America” policy. The scale of the defeat in Afghanistan and the speed with which it arrived staggered the diplomatic and defense establishments of two dozen countries and is leading to a realization that this American administration is primarily concerned with “infrastructure” and domestic societal issues.
And whatever the future structure of NATO may take, some basic re-thinking of priorities will also be needed. In the last few years, the emphasis on military spending has been on cyber warfare and drone capabilities. Laser and robotic research have also been stressed by strategic planners and armament manufacturers. But the Taliban didn’t conquer Afghanistan with satellites and computers. They won victory with men carrying rifles, trekking through some of the most rugged terrain in the world, and without the use of armored vehicles. They had no artillery, just rifles and, as Mr. Tugendhat mentioned, patience. Therefore, the lesson is that lasers and robots though wonderful inventions, may have to wait.
And the concept of future wars will have to reconsidered. Most Americans think in terms of lightening advances of armor supported by overwhelming air power, which inevitably leads to quick victories. That is part of the reason why Americans believe 20 years is more than enough time and patience to win a war. But not all wars can be fought in such a manner and though it is never a good idea for the enemy to dictate the terms of the conflict, the nature of the struggle and the location of the fight must always be included in the equation. We will have to come to the realization that massive armies engaged in huge maneuvers is not always the advisable or possible tactic. Not all wars can be won in such ways.
And the allocation of military resources, both materiel and human, will have to be rethought. The United States has had soldiers stationed in Germany and Japan and South Korea for far longer than our commitment to Afghanistan. These postings are accepted by the American public and governing class largely without protests, actually, without even periodic evaluation. And that will have to change also. We will have to begin asking some hard questions about the deployment of resources in parts of the world that have very little chance of seeing political disputes settled by military means.
In addition, many countries on the continent will finally have to face the fact that their armed forces are but a shadow of what will be needed in the future to deal with the slim possibility of provocations from Russia or China or, much more realistically, new terrorist threats emanating from the Middle East and now, from Central Asia. Since the end of the Second World War, Europe was preoccupied with rebuilding their societies and economies and more than willing to let the United States take the lead in military matters especially in dealing with the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War there was little reason for them to change their outlook. In fact, there was even less of a need for Europe to invest in military expenditures.
Now, European governments will have to explain to their peoples the need to reallocate funds from social programs to defense needs. This will be difficult and politically dangerous but necessary nonetheless. Because of Afghanistan, all of America’s allies have come to the sudden awareness that their decades of defense budget cuts have been a self-inflected wound due to the fact that the United States now has no interest to appear on the scene of every potential threat.
For years our country has requested, sometimes demanded, more European input into NATO, maintaining that we carried too much of the burden. Our arguments were to no avail. But the time to defend a wealthy continent from real or perceived enemies has come to the peoples of that continent. In short, Americans want what Europeans have enjoyed since the 1950’s; good schools for their children, quality health care, fine roads and airports, decent care of the environment, clean air and water. These things have bipartisan support with only disagreement on the way to fund them and the length of time to implement them.
If NATO desires to provide for its own security without the overbearing influence of the United States then there must be an urgent increase in its financial expenditures toward that security.
Now is a good time, before the barbarians are at the gates.